Abstract. The Rainbow Signature Scheme is a non-trivial generalization of the well known Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Signature Scheme (Eurocrypt '99) minimizing the length of the signatures. Recently a new variant based on non-commutative rings, called NC-Rainbow, was introduced at CT-RSA 2012 to further minimize the secret key size. We disprove the claim that NC-Rainbow is as secure as Rainbow in general and show how to reduce the complexity of MinRank attacks from 2 288 to 2 192 and of HighRank attacks from 2 128 to 2 96 for the proposed instantiation over the ring of Quaternions. We further reveal some facts about Quaternions that increase the complexity of the signing algorithm. We show that NC-Rainbow is just a special case of introducing further structure to the secret key in order to decrease the key size. As the results are comparable with the ones achieved by equivalent keys, which provably do not decrease security, and far worse than just using a PRNG, we recommend not to use NC-Rainbow. . MQ-schemes in general suer from comparably large key sizes. The Rainbow scheme over non-commutative rings proposed at CT-RSA 2012, also called NCRainbow [17] , claims to reduce the secret key size by 75% while obtaining the same level of security.
Introduction
Rainbow was proposed in 2005 [4] and is a layer-based variant of the well known multivariate quadratic (MQ) signature scheme Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV). UOV itself was proposed by Patarin et al. [8] at Eurocrypt 1999 and is one of the oldest MQ-schemes still unbroken. The downside of UOV is a comparably large signature expansion by a factor of 3 for current parameters (m = 28, n = 84) [16] . Rainbow improves this to signatures of length n = 42 for messages of length m = 24, also for current parameters (2 8 , 18, 12, 12) [5] . MQ-schemes in general suer from comparably large key sizes. The Rainbow scheme over non-commutative rings proposed at CT-RSA 2012, also called NCRainbow [17] , claims to reduce the secret key size by 75% while obtaining the same level of security.
Related Work. The parameter set (2 8 , 6, 6, 5, 5, 11) proposed for Rainbow in the original paper [4] was broken by Billet and Gilbert [2] in 2006 using a MinRank attack. The idea of those attacks was known since 2000 and rst proposed in [7] . At Crypto 2008 Faugère et al. [6] rened the technique of Billet and Gilbert using Gröbner Bases. Ding et al. took this attack into account and proposed new parameters of Rainbow in [5] . For a comprehensive comparison of all known attacks on Rainbow and proposals for secure parameters we refer to [12] . So far there are two dierent techniques known to reduce the secret key size of Rainbow. On the one hand we can introduce a special structure, such like a cyclic coecient matrix [11] and on the other hand we can use equivalent keys [13] . The latter exploits that large parts of the key are redundant and do not provide any security, whereas for the rst variant it is an open problem to quantify the loss of security.
Achievement and Organization. Section 2 introduces the NC-Rainbow signature scheme as proposed in [17] . For readers unfamiliar with multivariate quadratic schemes, we start by briey describing the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar scheme and its layer-based variant Rainbow. Section 3 explains the algebraic structure of the ring of Quaternions and show how these seriously speed up MinRank and HighRank attacks. 2 Basics
In this section we explain the Rainbow signature scheme over non-commutative rings as proposed in [17] and introduce the necessary notation. For a better understanding we rst briey introduce the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar as well as the Rainbow Signature Scheme.
The general idea of MQ-signature schemes is to use a public multivariate quadratic map P :
where γ (k) ij ∈ F q are some coecients, P (k) is the (n × n) matrix describing the quadratic form of p (k) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) . Note that we can neglect linear and constant terms as they never mix with quadratic terms and thus have no positive eects on security.
The trapdoor is given by a structured central map F :
In order to hide this trapdoor we choose two secret linear transformations S, T and dene P := T • F • S. See gure 1 for illustration. 
The corresponding matrix F (k) is depicted in gure 2. As we have m equations in m+v variables, xing v variables will yield a solution with high probability. Due to the structure of F (k) , i.e. there are no quadratic terms of two oil variables, we can x the vinegar variables at random to obtain a system of linear equations in the oil variables, which is easy to solve. This procedure is not possible for the public key, as the transformation S of variables fully mixes the variables (like oil and vinegar in a salad). Note that for UOV we can discard the transformation T of equations, as the trapdoor is invariant under this linear transformation.
Rainbow uses the same idea as UOV but in dierent layers. A current choice of parameters is given by (q, 12, 12) . In particular the eld size q = 2 8 and the number of layers is two. Note, two layers seems to be the best choice in order to prevent MinRank attacks and preserve short signatures at the same time. The central map F of Rainbow is divided into two layers F (1) , . . . , F (12) and F (13) , . . . , F (24) of form given in gure 3. Let
A formal description of F is given by the following formula. To use the trapdoor we rst solve the small UOV system F (1) , . . . , F (o1) by xing the v 1 vinegar variables at random. The solution u 1 , . . . , u v1+o1 is now used as vinegar variables of the second layer. Solving the obtained linear system yields u v1+o1+1 , . . . , u v1+o1+o2 .
The NC-Rainbow signature scheme proposed at CT-RSA 2012 [17] uses some non-commutative ring Q q with dimension r over F q to further decrease the secret key size. Due to the existence of a F q -linear isomorphism φ n : F nr q → Q n q with nr := n and mr := m, the central map F can be replaced by
The central map F, as dened in [17] , is given by the following polynomials.
Note that in contrast to [17] we neglect linear and constant terms. As not all coecients of those terms are chosen uniformly at random over F q (cf. section 3) they would provide further equations to speed up the Reconciliation attack (cf. Sec. 5, Eq. 4 in [15] ). As we will not investigate Reconciliation attacks, we just forget about this aw of NC-Rainbow.
The authors of [17] claimed that NC-Rainbow is as secure as the original Rainbow scheme, as every instance (Q q , v 1 , o 1 , o 2 ) of the former can be transformed to an instance (F q , v 1 , o 1 , o 2 ) of the latter, due to the F q -linear isomorphism φ. Well, as we will see below, this only provides an upper bound on the security.
First, we need the other direction to prove security, which does not hold due to the special choice of F. More precisely, we will see in lemma 2 that the size of F must be at least as large as the size of F to obtain exactly the same level of security.
Second, φ is not F r q -linear. So even if the size of F is large enough, it is not clear at all, if the additional structure of Q q can be used to attack the scheme. We will later use the structure of Quaternions to speed up MinRank and HighRank attacks.
Third, the ring used by the authors of [17] is commutative. But we do not restrict our cryptanalysis to this case and also investigate non-commutative rings (cf. remark 1).
In the sequel we explain and attack NC-Rainbow over the ring of Quaternions (cf. denition 1), as proposed by the authors of [17] . Note that the amount of additional structure introduced by F is independent of the encoding of the non-commutative ring and thus NC-Rainbow is not equally secure to Rainbow for every non-commutative ring (cf. lemma 2). But there might be smarter encodings than Quaternions, which speed up known attacks a little less. We still do not think it is worthwhile to search for those non-commutative rings, as the whole construction is just a special case of reducing key size by introducing some structure to the secret key. Compare [11, 13] for the state of the art.
Denition 1 (Ring of Quaternions). The non-commutative ring of Quaternions (Q q , +, ) of dimension r = 4 is dened by
The authors of [17] suggested to use the nite eld F 2 8 . Note there exists a F 2 8 -linear map given by φ : F Remark 1. The ring of Quaternions is commutative over elds of even characteristic, by denition of multiplication [14] . Thus we will distinguish between odd and even characteristic for every single attack in the sequel. Remark 2. The ring of Quaternions over nite elds is not a division ring (skew eld) [1] . This can be easily followed by a theorem of Wedderburn, who proved in 1905 that every nite skew eld is a eld (cf. theorem 2.55, page 70 in [10] ). The authors of [17] did not address the impact of this fact to the signing algorithm. For example the element (1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ Q 2 k does not have an inverse and thus it might become much harder to nd a solution of the linear system of oil variables. Note that the probability of a random element in Q q to have no inverse is 1/q. To determine all the structure over F q , we have a closer look at u i γ ij u j + u j γ ji u i over Q for i = j. We obtain φ
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Note that φ −1 • u i γ ij u j • φ produces 4 polynomials over F q with 16 monomials u 1i u 2j , i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Further for the original Rainbow scheme, all these 64 coecients of u 1i u 2j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4 in the secret polynomials f (1) , . . . , f (4) of F are chosen independently, uniformly at random. But due to the special choice of the central map of NC-Rainbow, now only 4 coecients t i are chosen uniformly at random. Clearly this introduce additional structure to the secret key F that can be used for algebraic attacks (cf. [15] ). In order to be as secure as the original scheme, we need at least as many coecients in the central map of NC-Rainbow as in the original. This is not possible for dimensions r > 2 due to lemma 1. Lemma 1. Let F q be any nite eld and R a non-commutative ring of dimension r > 2 over F q . Then NC-Rainbow over R with any secret map F can never be as secure as Rainbow. Proof. The maximal number of quadratic monomials containing variables u 1 and
Every element γ i ∈ R encodes r elements of F q and thus the maximal number of coecients we can choose uniformly at random over F q is 6r. On the other hand there are r 2 monomials over F q produced by u 1 and u 2 . All those monomials occur in r dierent polynomials and thus are represented by r 3 coecients in F q . In the case of Rainbow all these coecients are chosen independently, uniformly at random. While r 3 > 6r for r > 2 this is not possible for NC-Rainbow.
Next we observe that the matrices M i are heavily structured. A simple addition M 1 + M 2 + M 3 + M 4 provides a matrix with the same value in every entry and thus with rank 1 instead of 4. We will use this fact later on to improve MinRank attacks.
The following matrices produced by u i γ ii u i provide even more structure (cf. gure 5). For elds of odd characteristic the structure of M i produced by u i γ ij u j + u j γ ji u i becomes slightly more dicult.
Obtaining a generic, i.e. independent of the choice of coecients t i , linear com-
N with rank less than 4 becomes a little more involved. We now want to show that there always exists a matrix N with rank 3, i.e. we can nd a linear combination of columns such that
Collecting the coecients of t 1 , . . . , t 8 in every of the 4 components and setting them to zero provides 32 quadratic equations in the unknowns a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 and b 1 , b 2 , b 3 . We obtain the following solution by computing the Gröbner Basis of this system. Lemma 2. Let p > 2 be prime. Then there exists a, b such that
Proof. This lemma, as well as its proof, is well-known in literature. As the proof itself is very elegant, we give a brief description for readers who are unfamilar with this topic. Consider the two sets
Obviously all elements of A as well as of B are pairwise distinct. Due to |A| = |B| = p+1 2 we obtain a total amount of |A| + |B| = p + 1 elements. As | F p | = p there must be one element contained in both sets and thus
To conclude the preparation of our MinRank attack, we give the matrices produced by u i γ ii u i over elds of odd characteristic.
MinRank attack. The main idea of rank attacks is that the rank of F (k) is invariant under the bijective transformation of variables S but not under the transformation of equations T . Thus we can use the rank as distinguisher to recover T . Note that once T is known, S is also recovered comparably fast by UOV attacks like the one of Kipnis and Shamir [9] due to the special choice of parameters.
A naive way of performing a MinRank attack [2] is to sample a vector ω ∈ R F n q and hope that it lies in the kernel of a linear combination of low-rank matrices. If this is true, solving the linear system of equations Table 1 . Ranks of NC-Rainbow over even characteristic, experimentally derived. The last two columns give the maximum of all minimal ranks that we brute-forced in several experiments.
v1 o1 o2
Fi Table 2 . Ranks of NC-Rainbow over odd characteristic, experimentally derived. The last two columns give the maximum of all minimal ranks that we brute-forced in several experiments.
v1 o1 o2 Fi 28  22  26  5 1 2  24  32  22  28  5 2 1  28  32  24  30  5 2 2  28  36  24  31  5 3 3  32  44  27  39 Heuristic: We have experimentally derived that F ( v1, o1, o2) claimed real heuristic (5, 4, 4) 288 192 112 (7, 5, 5) 384 264 160 (9, 6, 6) 480 336 208
HighRank attack. Our observation regarding HighRank attacks holds both for even and odd characteristic.
Lemma 5. The complexity of HighRank attacks on NC-Rainbow over Q q is at most q o2− o2
instead of q o2 . Proof. We already mentioned that there exists a linear combination of high rank matrices such that the rank decrease. In particular for elds of even characteristic M 1 + M 2 + M 3 + M 4 has rank 1 instead of 4 and for elds of odd characteristic we showed in lemma 2 that there exists a generic linear combination of M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 with rank 3. Thus we do not have to remove all polynomials F i of high rank to observe a decrease of rank, but only 3 out of 4, i.e. in total we have to brute force 4 o 2 − o 2 = o 2 − o 2 linear combinations of public polynomials P i . Table 4 . Log2 complexity of HighRank attacks against NC-Rainbow over Qq.
( v1, o1, o2) claimed real (5, 4, 4) 128 96 (7, 5, 5) 160 120 (9, 6, 6) 192 144
